Monday, September 19, 2005

WE THE PEOPLE v. US - Re: Judge Sullivan's Decision -- An Open Letter To The "We The People Foundation".

WE THE PEOPLE v. US - Re: Judge Sullivan's Decision -- An Open Letter To The "We The People Foundation".

(This is the first of a two part series.)

The "We The People Foundation" sponsored the aforementioned case which was recently dismissed by Judge Emmet G. Sullivan in the US District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 04-1211.

The attorney who represented the plainittifs today filed a response regarding the District Court's decisions. The response is as defective as the pleadings that were filed and which were properly dismissed:

"In assessing the importance of this matter we must remember that whatever legal arguments have been posed or considered, the Court ultimately relied upon the Government's statement that the right to petition the Government for a redress of grievances no longer exists.

Of course, we intend to seek a review of that decision by a higher court. In the meantime, however, it is now the law of the land that your right to petition the Government has been abolished by the executive and judicial branches of the your Government.

Mark Lane"

This is a vast mistatement of Judge Sullivan's accurate opinion. I am directing the following exhaustive analysis to the We The People Foundation and their attorney, Mark Lane, in the hope that they will reconsider their post dismissal statement and react accordingly.

Citizen Spook has thoroughly reviewed the pleadings and the District Court's opinion.

This case was properly dismissed according to controlling legal precedent. However, the "We The People Foundation" must be congratulated for scoring an important victory which is discerned by a thorough review of Judge Sullivan's historic and remarkable opinion which acts as map for a new and improved first amendment petition for a redress of grievances as to the federal income tax problem.

I hope that the plaintiffs and their attorney, Mark Lane, will review this report and withdraw their appeal in favor a new and improved version of this lawsuit.

PROLOGUE

We the people give the Constitution its life force. It is our breathe that animates the document's respiration and by force of will we do the same for the government which is also ours. It is not the other way around. The government does not own us. We have the power to change things. We are not helpless to correct wrongs. We are not helpless to bring nourishment to the Constitution when that child of ours is starving for food of thought and attention to its coming demise, which if left to happen, will be the end of our nation and all of us individually.

All of the problems we are facing come from the neglect we are responsible for allowing. The government is out of control and its anarchy is bipartisanly evident simply by looking at the national debt clock. We do not have control of our nation because we do not have control of our nation's money. In 1913 we gave control and ownership of the nation's monetary independence to a private banking cartel bearing the misleading moniker, THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK, whose owners are not the federal government and whose vaults do not contain any reserves.

The IRS became the enforcement protector of this institution which collects the fruits of our livelihood and plunders such fruit to a pirate banking cartel, some of whom are apparently foreign nationals.

The American people pay their taxes each year because they love this country and honestly believe their federal income tax dollars are providing the infrastructure to keep this great nation going. Until the American pproperly educated to the true destination of their tax dollars, any attempt to educate them to either the possibility that the IRS code does not require a yearly income tax to be individually paid directly to the government or to the possible unconstitutional use of the IRS code will be met by derision and supported by a federal conspiracy of sanction and silence.

The ultimate purpose of the petition for redress is to exercise our will that the government openly address our grievances. In order to accomplish that goal we must access the courts via pleadings which state genuine controversies and claims upon which relief may be granted. Whether that "redress" is ever actually granted is secondary in importance to forcing the courts to openly discuss the merits of the "grievances" listed in the petition which concern conflicting IRS code provisions and the constitutionality of imposing a federal income tax on domestic income of the American people.

The "We The People Foundation" petition failed to state claims upon which, according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and controlling Supreme Court precedent, relief might be granted. Regardless, Judge Sullivan's opinion is very educational and serves as an alluring enticement of "We the People" to rethink strategy for the purpose of submitting a new and improved petition for redress of grievances regarding the federal income tax laws and the Federal Reserve banking system.

The first amendment states, in part:

"Congress shall make no law...abridging...the right of the people to...petition the Government for a redress of grievances."

No statute may prevent "the people" from petitioning the government for a redress of grievances. Unlike statutory laws which seek to limit the American people's access to the courts, for example, the Anti Injunction Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act, the Constitution does not limit the subject matter of the first amendment right to petition the government for a redress of grievances in any way.

The Constitution also does not guarantee that such a petition will be successful. Indeed, a fair reading of Supreme Court precedent indicates a response to any petition for a redress of grievances is not even required by the government. So, in order to maximize the potential success of any future attempt to use the first amendment right to petition the government for a redress of grievances, the "controversy" must be brought in the name of a much larger set of plaintiffs who pay their taxes and are thoroughly educated regarding the Federal Reserve/IRS nexus.

To see our government returned to its natural benevolent form, a critical mass is necessary. Without such a grassroots movement, the federal behemoth that we the people have created will devour all who come before it.

1. ANALYSIS OF JUDGE SULLIVAN'S DECISION

Warning to the "We the People Foundation"; your appeal is doomed and should not be carried forward. Instead, the proper approach is to start over from scratch with a larger set of plaintiffs and a complete overhaul of strategy.

The "We the People Foundation" petition made two basic claims; the first was for a redress of grievances regarding the government's repeated failure to answer legitimate questions about the income tax laws, while the second claim pertained to various enforcement actions taken by the government against plaintiffs for failing to pay taxes or submit returns.

Judge Sullivan stated that, in both cases, the petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Judge Sullivan reinforced this decision by citing controlling Supreme Court precedent. In passing, he also discussed various statutes which generally limit access to the courts regarding disputes concerning the federal tax laws.

Despite the fact that your pleadings were naive and did not state a claim upon which relief might be granted, you deserve credit for scoring an important victory; the judicial branch actually took your lawsuit seriously and responded. Furthermore, it appears that Judge Sullivan's decision provides implied guidance on how to cure the defective nature of your petition.

The results of your petition should not be underestimated nor should they be tested again by the Court of Appeals under the pleadings you originally submitted. To resubmit these pleadings to the Court of Appeals would only damage the chances of a better suit prevailing. Take a small victory now and use it as the basis for a much bigger one later.

The "Statement Of Facts" in the petition alleges two separate forms of grievance:

A) THE FAILURE OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO ADDRESS THE PLAINTIFFS' PETITION FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES

B) THE RETALIATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGAINST PLAINTIFFS FOR PETITIONING THE GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES

We shall examine "part B" first.

THE ENFORCEMENT ACTION GRIEVANCES

Let's first examine Judge Sullivan's decision as it pertains to the petition's grievances regarding various enforcement actions your plaintiffs have suffered by not paying taxes or filing returns. Your petition sought an injunction restraining the government from prosecuting plaintiffs who, by virtue of their not paying taxes or filing returns, were subjected to various forms of prosecution by the IRS and the DOJ.

The Supreme Court has made it quite clear in Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991) that:

"[A] defendant's views about the validity of the tax statutes are irrelevant to the issue of willfulness, need not be heard by the jury, and if they are, an instruction to disregard them would be proper. For this purpose, it makes no difference whether the claims of invalidity are frivolous or have substance."

It is well established in the federal courts that a challenge to the Constitutionality of the federal income tax laws will not be allowed as a defense against willful failure to pay the tax even if the arguments you present have substance. Your slogan, "No Answers, No Taxes", which appears at your site, certainly is one approach to the problem, but that approach is likely to get anybody who follows it thrown in jail. So please stop advocating it.

I know it's frustrating to be consistently ignored by the government when you're asking legitimate questions. But encouraging others to not pay the federal income tax or to file "sly" returns trying to game the system based upon your personal understanding of the system, no matter how evil that system may be, is the wrong approach.

Judge Sullivan's decision correctly cites much controlling precedent for the following proposition:

"Plaintiffs do not...have a first amendment right to withhold money owed to the government and to avoid governmental enforcement actions because they object to government policy."

Judge Sullivan cited numerous case law to support this proposition which is totally consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in Cheek v.US.

The pleadings which sought to petition the Government to redress the grievances related to enforcement actions prosecuted against your plaintiffs never stood a chance in hell of surviving a summary motion to dismiss.

Judge Sullivan:

"Congress has provided methods for challenging the legality of such enforcement actions and prevent governmental abuse...Citizens have a right of action for lawful levies or other collection actions and for wrongful failure to release liens. Id. at 7426(a). And taxpayers may sue to recover money erroneously or illegally assessed or collected by the government. Id. at 7422(a)."

In theory, plaintiffs could pay the income tax and thereafter file suit to recover it based upon the "861" concepts and/or "Article 1:Section 8" Constitutional arguments.

The problem with this approach is that many people who have tried it have been subjected to harassment for filing "frivolous" law suits.

So it's a catch 22. But there is a way around it which will be discussed below.

GRIEVANCES RELATED TO GOVERNMENTAL FAILURE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS

Your other claim petitioned "the judicial branch" to compel "the executive or legislative branches" to answer your questions regarding federal tax laws. This aspect of the petition did not state a claim upon which relief might be granted for two reasons:

a) The petition was not Constitutionally sound because it requested that the judicial branch compel the defendants to respond to your petition. Nothing in the Constitution gives the judicial branch such authority. Nothing written in the Constitution establishes that the legislative and executive branches must listen to your petition to redress grievances. The first amendment only says that your right to "petition" can't be "abridged."

In that regard, you didn't make a petition for a redress upon which the judicial branch had the power to act. Your suit was dismissed because you asked the judicial branch to force the other branches to do something -- "answer your questions" -- which the judicial branch has no authority to compel them to do.

If your petition had requested, for example, redress in the form of a refund of taxes previously paid, while the petition might ultimately have failed as to the merits, it would not have failed on procedural grounds, and might therefore have had the effect of procuring judicial review and response to the underlying issues regarding the legality of the federal income tax laws. And procuring such an open judicial review must be considered the holy grail of this type of petition.

Judge Sullivan was correct in holding that your requests did not state a claim upon which relief might be granted because he was bound to follow the Supreme Court's holding in Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, 441 U.S. 463 (1979):

"Plaintiffs contend that they therefore have a constitutional right to a response to the petitions they have filed with the various defendants...The Supreme Court, however, has held that 'the First Amendment does not impose any affirmative obligation on the government to listen, to respond or, in this context, to recognize the association and bargain with it.' 441 U.S. 463, 465 (1979)."

I don't agree with the Supreme Court's ruling in the Smith case because, based upon the historical record pertaining to the right of the people to "petition the government for a redress grievances", it appears obvious that the framers intended that the right to petition implied a right to a response. The right to petition does not include a "right to be successful" as to the petition for redress, but if it is a right at all, it must imply a "right" to a response.

It was the British Crown's blatant unwillingness to respond to the colonists' "petitions to redress grievances" which caused the American revolution in the first place. From the Columbia University Free Press Encyclopedia:

"Official acts that colonists considered infringements upon their rights had previously led to the Stamp Act Congress (1765) and to the First Continental Congress (1774), but these were predominantly conservative assemblies that sought redress from the crown and reconciliation, not independence. The overtures of the First Continental Congress in 1774 came to nothing, discontent grew, and as the armed skirmishes at Lexington and Concord (Apr. 19, 1775) developed into the American Revolution, many members of the Second Continental Congress of Philadelphia followed the leadership of John Hancock, John Adams, and Samuel Adams in demanding independence."

Now have a look at what the Declaration of Independence says:

"The History of the present King of Great-Britain is a History of repeated Injuries and Usurpations, all having in direct Object the Establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid World...

In every stage of these Oppressions we have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble Terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated Injury..."

The right to petition the government was then, and is now, an "inalienable right". The preservation of that right was so important to the founding fathers that they put it in the first amendment of the Bill of Rights. When you consider that they chose to go to war with the Crown as a direct result of their grievances not being "listened to" and "responded to", it boggles the mind that the Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that "the First Amendment does not impose any affirmative obligation on the government to listen [or] to respond" to petitions for a redress of grievances by the American people.

The Supreme Court's decision in Smith held that the government, as far as the Constitution is concerned, does not have to listen or respond to the petitions of the people for a redress of grievances. Essentially, because of this decision, the first amendment is construed by the Supreme Court ( and therefore all lower courts) as only protecting your right to petition the government for a redress of grievances, while they deny a right to a response. Regardless, their decision in Smith is limited in its application to the legislative and executive branches.

The judicial branch, on the other hand, does have to listen and respond to first amendment petitions for redress of grievances because of their enumerated constitutional powers to hear genuine controversies (Article 3, Section. 2, Clause 1; explained in detail below). This is evidenced by the fact that the District Court listened to and considered the "We the People Foundation" petition and also responded with a well documented and legally sound seven page opinion.

b) The redress requested was "answers" to "questions". Such relief does not present a legitimate "controversy" which is required before federal courts may issue rulings.

A petition for "redress" must be a petition for change, or a petition to correct rather than clarify.

Redress is defined as:

1. To set right; remedy or rectify.

2. To make amends to.

3. To make amends for. See Synonyms at correct.

4. To adjust (a balance, for example).

The "We the People Foundation" petition sought "redress" in the form of answers to questions. "Answers" alone, to the questions presented in the petition, would not remedy or rectify the illegality of the federal income tax laws.

The subtextural purpose of your petition was to corner the defendants and make them answer your questions about the federal tax laws. "Questions" imply that the plaintiffs are confused. This may not actually be the case, since the plaintiffs, through their published literature, do subjectively believe that their understanding of the income tax laws are accurate.

Regardless, the "grievances" that your "petition" plead in this part of the complaint demanded that the court compel the other two branches of government to answer questions. The only grievance the court could possibly imply, based upon this aspect of the pleadings, was that plaintiffs didn't "understand" the laws and were demanding that the government "explain" the laws. The grievance was presented as a character of the plaintiff's subjective intelligence. How could the court possibly order the government to end your confusion?

Redress is defined above. The answers plaintiffs sought to compel would not "make amends" or "adjust" the laws. The answers might clarify the plaintiffs' understanding, but your misunderstanding is not a "grievance" to which the court has enumerated powers apply redress.

In considering the government's summary motion to dismiss your complaint, Judge Sullivan was required to construe all of the alleged facts listed in your complaint as being true:

" 'Accordingly, at this stage of the proceedings, the court must accept as true all of the complaint's factual allegations.' Johnson v. District of Columbia, 190 F. Supp. 2d 34, 39 (D.D.C. 2002)."

While Judge Sullivan's opinion does not validate that the federal tax laws are constitutionally and statutorily flawed, for purposes of the summary motion to dismiss, he was required to accept that all of plaintiffs' factual allegations were true. Having done that, the motion to dismiss had to be granted because the redress you requested, answers to your questions, is not actually redress at all. The best characterization is that you requested the court to force the other branches to issue an advisory opinion. The judicial branch is specifically barred from issuing advisory opinions (discussed in detail below). Article III of the constitution so limits their jurisdiction, so how could they possibly compel the other branches to issue advisory opinions?

To be procedurally correct, the form of redress you request must be something that the court's enumerated powers allows them to grant. Had you asked that the constitutionally flawed laws be "corrected" or "amended", the court, at that stage of the proceeding, being required by law to accept your factual allegations as being true, would have been forced to deny the motion to dismiss.

By requesting that the judicial branch compel the defendants in the other branches to "answer" your "questions", you have not stated a claim upon which relief may be granted.

STATUTES REFERENCED IN JUDGE SULLIVAN'S OPINION

Judge Sullivan, in dismissing the petition, also referred to the Anti Injunction Act which states that no suit brought for "the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person".

He also cited the Declaratory Judgement Act for precedent that United States courts, which would otherwise have power to decide the rights of Parties in genuine controversies, have no power to "declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration..." "with respect to federal taxes".

The pleadings in the "We the People" case were further defective because they played directly into the hands of these two statutes. Below, I will discuss ways to cure these defects.

2. THE NEW PETITION FOR A REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES

While the federal courts have consistently dismissed, often with sanctions attached, taxpayer suits to recover taxes paid via "tax protestor" arguments for being frivolous, the majority of those suits are brought under traditional statutory access to the courts as opposed to a formal first amendment "petition for a redress of grievances." Indeed, the complaint filed by the "We The People Foundation", by its very wording, does not even make a formal "petition for a redress of grievances" to the judicial branch of the government.

The title of your complaint reads:

"AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF, EQUITABLE RELIEF AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF"

While various individual counts mention previous "petitions for redress" by your plaintiffs to the executive and legislative branches, the actual complaint that you filed is not a formal first amendment "petition for redress of grievances".

I will continue to refer to your complaint as a "petition" throughout this report, but the distinction must be understood clearly before you can truly understand the proper manner to procedurally approach the court that will trigger the powers enumerated to the federal courts by the constitution.

On the right side of every complaint filed in the federal courts, the complaint must be written in big bold letters. In the next incarnation of this lawsuit you must word your complaint as follows:

"COMPLAINT: FIRST AMENDMENT PETITION FOR A REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES"

That statement should be followed by specific requests for redress in the form of money or injunctive relief. As long as the suit is brought under the first amendment right to petition for a redress of grievances, it will be unique and distinguishable from the multitude of statutory suits that come before the federal courts.

Regardless of the failure of your complaint to state that the lawsuit was a formal petition of the judicial branch for a redress of grievances, Judge Sullivan's opinion in its impressive wisdom, discussed your complaint in light of your first amendment right to petition the government for redress and provided guidance for future litigants in this historic opinion.

The fact that the judicial branch listened to the arguments and responded to them with a seven page opinion, rather than ignoring you completely as per the Supreme Court's holding in Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, illustrates that the application of the holding in the Smith case is strictly limited to the executive and legislative branches.

In United States v. Microsoft, which was also decided in the US District Court for the District of Columbia, the court stated:

"It is well settled that Article III of the United States Constitution limits this court's exercise of judicial power to "cases" and "controversies". U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1968). Justiciability is the term of art employed to give expression to the limitation placed upon federal courts by the case-and-controversy doctrine." Id. at 95. "It is quite clear that 'the oldest and most consistent thread in the federal law of justiciability is that the federal courts will not give advisory opinions.' Id. at 96 (quoting C. Wright. Federal Courts 34 (1963))."

Note that this is the same District Court Judge Sullivan sits on. The District court has no power to issue advisory opinions, and Judge Sullivan's opinion certainly did not dismiss the case on the grounds that the pleadings requested an advisory opinion. So it's obvious that the pleadings brought by the plaintiffs in the "We the People Foundation" suit raised justiciable issues and that the power exercised by the District Court in reviewing the pleadings was proper because the pleadings referred to genuine "cases and controversies".

But how can this be true when we consider the Supreme Court's holding in the Smith case? If the first amendment right to petition the government for a redress of grievances does not require the government to listen or respond to the American people, as per the Supreme Court's holding in Smith, does that mean the District Court's seven page decision dismissing the case is simply an advisory opinion? The Supreme Court has clearly established that the federal courts may not issue advisory opinions, so, by virtue of the District Court actually ruling upon your petition, it's clear that a genuine "case or controversy" was recognized to exist.

Article 3, Section. 2, Clause 1:

"The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution...to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party..."

The complaint involved a "controversy" to which the United States is a Party. And that's exactly why Judge Sullivan issued a decision. It's just that the controversy was defective on grounds other than justiciability.

Meriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law defines the legal meaning of the word "Controversy":

"Article III of the U.S. Constitution gives the judiciary the power to decide cases and controversies. Article III's limitation of the judicial power to cases or controversies requires that an action brought in the federal court involve parties with standing to sue and questions that are ripe and not moot."

Taxpayer lawsuits are often struck down on the grounds of "standing". "Standing" refers to the right of a certain party to bring suit. But for our purposes -- petitioning the government for redress of grievances under the first amendment -- standing is not an issue. We the people are guaranteed the right to petition and the Constitution does not limit the "grievances" we may bring or the "redress" we may request. We may not prevail, but we do not have to prove standing in this type of pleading and therefore a discussion as to the long line of legal precedent involved with "standing" is not necessary in this case.

Indeed, Judge Sullivan has given us guidance that the pleadings did, in fact, involve genuine "Article III" controversies when he discussed the Declaratory Judgment Act.

The Supreme Court's holding in Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees ("[T]he first Amendment does not impose any affirmative obligation on the government to listen, to respond or, in this context, to recognize the association and bargain with it." 441 U.S. 463, 465") cannot apply to the judicial branch since all petitions for a redress of grievances involve the United States as a Party to the controversy pleaded, and under the powers enumerated in Article 3, Section 2, Clause 1, the judicial branch must listen to the people's petitions for redress of grievances and must respond to them.

The "We the People Foundation" complaint was not dismissed because the judicial branch wasn't required to listen and respond. It was dismissed because it truly did not state a claim upon which relief might be granted.

CURING THE PETITION'S DEFECTS

PART 1: Pay the tax first.

Plaintiffs should pay their taxes then file a traditional statutory lawsuit to recover those taxes they have submissively paid to the government.

The ideal plaintiffs would be those who paid the full amount of federal income tax assessed by the IRS followed by a failed suit to recover that money using an "861" or "Article 1:Section 8" argument. Plaintiffs who were also penalized for filing "frivolous" actions in trying to recover taxes paid would be even better suited to petition the government for a redress of grievances because they would have exhausted all other possibility of remedy discussed by Judge Sullivan in his opinion.

Then later, after those remedies have been judicially exhausted, having been left with no other option to voice their grievances, a formal first amendment petition for redress of grievances could not be dismissed or sanctioned for being frivolous since the first amendment guarantees the people's right to petition cannot be "abridged". Such plaintiffs will have the best chance of challenging the IRS code under the first amendment right to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

The District Court could not dismiss these cases for the same reasons listed in Judge Sullivan's opinion since the plaintiffs would have complied with the law in the first place.

Such a plaintiff would be insulated from Judge Sullivan's most potent and legally sound arguments for determining that the petitioner had failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Furthermore, such a plaintiff could petition for a redress of both the tax paid and the penalty for bringing a frivolous suit.

The first amendment states: "Congress shall make no law...abridging...the right of the people to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." If your lawsuit has been brought to the judicial branch as a formal "petition for redress of grievances" under the first amendment, whatever laws Congress may have enacted to punish so called "frivolous" tax protestor lawsuits will not be applicable. Your right to petition is completely protected by the first amendment.

The Supreme Court's holding in Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees 441 U.S. 463, 464:

"The First Amendment protects the right of an individual to speak freely, to advocate ideas, to associate with others, and to petition his government for redress of grievances...The government is prohibited from infringing upon these guarantees either by a general prohibition against certain forms of advocacy, NAACP v. Button, supra, or by imposing sanctions for the expression of particular views it opposes, e. g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964)."

PART 2: The Anti Injunction Act And The Declaratory Injunction Act

There's two ways to avoid the reach of these acts.

1. Make sure to have separate counts listed in the pleadings of the next petition which do not ask for an injunction "to restrain the assessment or collection of any tax" and do not request any "Declaratory Judgments".

The plaintiffs should request redress, in one count of their petition, in the form of a refund of past federal income taxes paid. Such a request does not ask the court to "restrain the assessment or collection of any tax." The assessment and collection has already taken place. This particular count of the petition would not be asking for an injunction, which is an equity remedy. Rather, this count will demand a remedy in law, a monetary refund based upon a defective "statute", rather than a defective "assessment".

Another count in the petition would also request monetary damages, in the alternative, based upon a constitutional tort by alleging that the IRS code, if not defective via "861" arguments, must be unconstitutional under "Article 1:Section 8".

Neither of the above requests redress in the form of an injunction and therefore the Anti Injunction Act would not be applicable.

2. The petition should also include a separate count requesting an injunction to "restrain the assessment and collection" of future taxes in order to directly challenge, head on, the constitutionality of the Anti Injunction Act.

At first glance, Judge Sullivan's opinion appears to support a plenary ban, via the authority of the Anti Injunction Act, directed at any request to "restrain the assessment or collection of any tax" by requesting such an injunction in the courts. But that is not what Judge Sullivan's opinion says. His application of the Anti Injunction Act is limited to those plaintiffs who have taken the question of redress of grievances into their own hands by refusing to pay the income tax and/or failing to file tax returns. His opinion in this regard is specifically limited, by his own language, to this particular group of plaintiffs who asked the court to restrain the enforcement actions which resulted from their taking the law into their own hands.

Judge Sullivan cites a long list of precedent which stands for the well established rule of law which unequivocally states that the American people have no first amendment right to protest by not paying their taxes. It's quite obvious, that if there is to be any judicial review of the grievances we the people may have about the federal income tax laws, such review will not be forthcoming when we the people take the law into our own hands. And this is why it's imperative that, if the "We The People Foundation" are to lead the way in this struggle to petition our government for a redress of grievances, they must stop antagonizing the government, drop the slogan "No Answers, No Taxes" and encourage those who come to them for advice to pay their taxes and file honest returns.

We the people of the United States have not exhausted our possibilities within the letter of the laws of our nation. We have only just begun to fight. But the fight must exist within the very letter of the law. Perhaps there will come a time for a new "Declaration of Independence" from the federal government, but I hope that never comes because it will only come if the Constitution is killed. And at this moment in time, the Constitution, while suffering disease, is still alive and kicking.

So, following the aforementioned list of precedent, Judge Sullivan discusses his application of the Anti Injunction Act to the petition before the court:

"Moreover, the injunctive relief that plaintiffs seek, that is, 'a temporary injunction against the United States Internal Revenue Service and the Department of Justice and any other agency of the United States that arguably may act in this matter under color of law, from taking any further retaliatory actions against the named plaintiffs in this proceeding,' is clearly barred by the Anti Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C § 7421...("The Anti Injunction Act provides that no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person'.)"

Judge Sullivan was very careful to limit the application of the Anti Injunction Act to the specific plaintiffs upon which retaliatory actions had been taken; the same set of plaintiffs who had broken the law. Judge Sullivan's opinion does not attach a blanket application to all plaintiffs in the petition.

Of course, the petition was dismissed for those plaintiffs as well, but according to the intelligent wording of Judge Sullivan's opinion, as to the plaintiffs who did not take the law into their own hands, the petition was dismissed on procedural grounds for failing to state a claim upon which relief might be granted. The petition was only dismissed on substantive grounds for those plaintiffs who took the law into their own hands and were requesting that enforcement proceedings be restrained.

The most important case the petition cited was California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972). In that case, the Supreme Court made it clear that "the right to petition extends to all departments of government", and that "the right of access to the courts is...but one aspect of the right to petition." Id. at 510.

The judicial branch must listen and respond to the people's petition to the government for a redress of grievances when the petition raises a genuine "case or controversy". And the language of the first amendment, "Congress shall make no law...abridging...the right of the people to...petition the Government for a redress of grievances" makes it clear that the Anti Injunction Act, a law made by Congress, cannot "abridge" the people's right to petition the government. As such, the district court certainly could not dismiss a formal petition for redress of grievances under the Anti Injunction Act alone.

Judge Sullivan's inclusion of the Anti Injunction Act and The Declaratory Judgement Act, in my opinion, acts as a clue to the mood of the court. Judge Sullivan, while dismissing the complaint on grounds that no claim was stated upon which relief might be granted, also included the Anti Injunction Act and the Declaratory Judgement Act references, which, while certainly relevant to the specific defective pleadings in the petition before the court, were not necessary to dismiss the petition on strictly procedural grounds under FRCP 12(b) (6).

Those references are very educational for future first amendment petitions to the government for a redress of grievances regarding the federal income tax laws. Judge Sullivan has provided clear guidance that any such petition must, if it is to be justiciably impeccable, address these particular statutes properly since the statutes reflect the will of Congress, the elected representatives of the American people.

While the Anti Injunction Act prohibits that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person", Congress cannot restrain the courts from ruling on the merits of a complaint "to restrain the assessment or collection of taxes" with regards to a constitutionally protected first amendment formal petition for redress of grievances since the constitution guarantees that the people's right to petition cannot be "abridged".

Of course, petitioners must still prove that the "redress" they have requested is warranted on constitutional or statutory grounds. But once petitioners are over the hurdle of the Congressional prohibition on all courts against "maintaining" any suit to restrain the assessment and collection of any tax, the holy grail -- an open review of the various income tax problems -- must eventually be forthcoming.

This is really what we're hoping to achieve, an "on the record" judicial discussion concerned with the constitutionality of the federal income tax as well as a determination of the implications of "861" challenges to the IRS code.

The People's right to petition for a redress of grievances is guaranteed by the first amendment and cannot be abridged by the Anti Injunction Act. If the people believe that the IRS and the IRS code operate oppressively and against their inalienable rights as defined in the constitution, they must activate their first amendment right to petition the government to redress this grievance. The petition for redress is a genuine controversy which involves the taking of wealth by legislative means.

CONCLUSION

From Judge Sullivan's opinion:

"The Declaratory Judgement Act provides that '[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to federal taxes ... any court of the United States ... may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief could be sought.' 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (Supp. III 1985) By their terms, these statutes

Judge Sullivan, by referencing the Declaratory Judgement Act and applying it to the plaintiffs' defective pleadings, provided important guidance which must be heeded by future plaintiffs accessing the courts by way of a formal first amendment petition for redress of grievances.

It's extremely important to consider the fact that the Judge's dismissal of this complaint need not have gone any further than stating that plaintiffs failed to present a claim upon which relief might be granted. Dismissal was certainly appropriate on this point alone. But Judge Sullivan went further than that, and in doing so he has pointed our attention towards the proper strategy for bringing a formal petition for redress of grievances under the first amendment in the federal courts.

The "mood of the court" to be gaged by Judge Sullivan's opinion appears to be one of guarded, but willing review. This is positively electrifying when you consider how easy it would have been for Judge Sullivan to simply ignore the petition entirely by relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Smith, or, in the alternative, he might have dismissed the complaint with a two paragraph opinion highlighting the defective procedural application to the court.

Instead, Judge Sullivan laid it all out in clear language which was not antagonistic to the plaintiffs. I strongly believe that the number of plaintiffs who were willing to expose themselves by putting their names and addresses down on the "We the People Foundation" complaint registered with the District Court which acted compassionately by writing a thoroughly educational decision.

I believe the mood of the court reflected by Judge Sullivan's opinion exhibits a recognition that the court is aware of the confusing issues surrounding our federal income tax situation as well as the growing number of disenfranchised citizens effected by this confusion. It also reflects that the court is aware of thecult of "tax protestor" charlatans preying upon legitimately confused citizens and that such charlatans are swaying many citizens to subject themselves to IRS and DOJ prosecution by not filing legal returns and failing to pay taxes.

There are patriots sitting on our federal benches who are waiting for the American people to get this right and to bring a formal petition for redress of grievances before them so that our constitutionally mandated system of checks and balances can get to the bottom of this federal income tax dilemma that effects all of us. In order to reach those who might help us, we must come before them with clean hands, impeccable pleadings and superior precedent.

It is my sincere hope that the plaintiffs in the "We The People Foundation" lawsuit will not jeopardize future petitions by challenging Judge Sullivan's opinion in the Court of Appeals.

That would be a grave mistake. Judge Sullivan's decision is flawless regarding the dismissal of this petition. If the Court of Appeals finds any fault with Judge Sullivan's decision, it will not be addressed to the dismissal which will not be reversed. I guarantee that. And any counsel that reads Judge Sullivan's decision and encourages the plaintiffs to waste further resources as well as the court's time, ought to be fired.

Instead of reinstating the lawsuit, any opinion issued by the Court of Appeals, if it accepts review of Judge Sullivan's opinion, may quite possibly create precedent which will prevent the District Court from entertaining any such petition again. This would be a damn shame considering the mood of the District Court as evidenced by Judge Sullivan's opinion. The American people desperately need to access that court with proper pleadings in a complaint for a formal petition for redress of grievances. Your appeal, instead of opening the door for the current lawsuit, gravely risks the upper Court of Appeals shutting the door for future lawsuits in our face.

I hope the "We The People Foundation" will read between the lines and withdraw their petition. The door appears open for a District Court review on the merits of the federal income tax question if presented as a formal petition for a redress of grievances, but no such review will be forthcoming without complete purity of the plaintiffs who must submit flawless pleadings which do not offend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or United States Supreme Court precedent.

While the historical record pertaining to the inalienable right to petition the government for a redress of grievances indicates that such a right implies a right to a response, the Constitution does not enumerate such a right and therefore the judicial branch has no power to compel the legislative and executive branches to listen or respond to the American people's petitions for redress.

Furthermore, asking for answers to questions does not indicate a genuine case or controversy to which the district court is authorized to act upon. Any future petition for a redress of grievances must demand actual redress. The redress requested should include;

-the return of wealth taken by the government

-injunctions upon the government to restrain any further unconstitutional taking of wealth

-injunctions upon the government to restrain any further taking of wealth via improper application of the IRS code

- revocation of defective IRS code provisions

- any other redress which raises a genuine case or controversy that can only be addressed by a petition of the government to redress grievances

3. The plan to create a million man petition for a redress of grievances.

If we can educate the American people regarding the issues listed in the soon to be published pamphlet, COMMON SENSE AGAIN, we will get one million or more plaintiffs to join the next incarnation of this lawsuit.

Of course, the American people would love to pay less taxes, but, for the most part, they accept a patriotic duty to pay taxes. Trumpeting arguments to them that they don't have to pay income taxes because of obscure technical issues involved with the 54000 page IRS monstrosity will never garner the massive support needed to change things, despite the substantive truth of the argument. The devil is in the details.

The new plan calls for a clear and concise explanation of the following:

a. the private nature of the Federal Reserve Bank, its stockholders and the inherent unconstitutional nature of fractional reserve banking

b. the ratio of federal income tax dollars used to pay off the fictional, unconstitutional and oppressive national debt versus the sums proportioned for civil administration, roads, military and other vital purposes of the federal government

c. the true history of the Constitution's taxing authority and the Supreme Court's decisions regarding such authority prior to and after the 16th amendment

d. the history of the IRS code, with specific focus on the "861" argument and the codes which have evolved in relation to it

e. the history supporting the first amendment right to petition the government for a redress of grievances

Once the American people understand that they have been robbed blind and that the money they thought was being used to run the government is actually being funneled, in a manner that would make Enron's frauds seem paltry, to the vaults of a few private banking institutions, the people will wake up and join the million man petition for a redress of grievances. The power is with the people, but unless the people use that power it remains dormant. We haven't awoken enough people to their proactive power as the respiratory system of the Constitution and the government. In order to make the government submissive to the will of the people, the people must be educated.

Once the American people are educated to the concept that the toil of their labor can be used for their own prosperity, rather than the prosperity of a few banking cartels and their lackeys, the American people will wake up and do the right thing. And then the current Federal Reserve system, along with its enforcers in the IRS, will be eliminated along with the faux national debt.

On average, each American family is said to owe approximately $275,000 towards the national debt while the seven plus TRILLION dollars allegedly owed to the banking cartels, for money we were forced to borrow from our own money tree, is to be divided up among a few banking institutions. When the American people are educated to understand that they must choose between standing up to these banking cartels by taking back their money tree and refusing to finance the very extortion being perpetrated upon them or living in complete servitude to the will of these bankers and their enforcement divisions, the American people will take the money and run...the government the way the framers intended it to be run.

The next installment in this series will be entitled:

COMMON SENSE AGAIN

By Citizen Spook

citizenspook@hotmail.com

I AM REQUESTING THE PROACTIVE READERS OF THIS BLOG TO DISTRIBUTE THIS REPORT FURTHER AND WIDER THAN ALL PREVIOUS CS REPORTS ESPECIALLY TO "WE THE PEOPLE FOUNDATION" CONTACTS.

I APOLOGIZE FOR NOT ANSWERING YOUR E MAILS AND COMMENTS. I CANNOT KEEP UP WITH ALL OF THE MESSAGES, BUT I DO READ THEM ALL AND I THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND SUPPORT. IT IS VERY MOTIVATIONAL.


Tuesday, September 13, 2005

TREASONGATE: A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOVERY:Pardons May Be Voided For Criminal Prosecutions Flowing From "Cases of Impeachment"


The Constitution Voids Presidential Pardons For Criminal Convictions Or Indictments Flowing From "Cases of Impeachment" Where The Senate Has Voted To Convict.
(the image is only referenced in the Epilogue)

[UPDATED Sept 14, 2005, 7:15 a.m. Substantive additions are in red.]


PROLOGUE: Citizen Spook has timed this report to coincide with John Roberts' confirmation hearings for Chief Justice of The Supreme Court. Roberts' most important function, as far as the Bush White House is concerned, will be to ensure that presidential pardons, issued by Bush in relation to Treasongate offenses, will be upheld by the highest court in the land.

As Chief Justice, Roberts will have the most power to steer the court and to determine which justice will write the court's opinion on controversial topics. While the entire nation focuses on whether Roberts would overturn Roe v. Wade, much more important to the Bush White House is the role Roberts will play in the impending Constitutional crisis over presidential pardons for the Treasongate offenders.

Many readers of this blog have expressed concern that any indictments returned by Patrick Fitzgerald's grand jury(s) will simply be nullified by presidential pardons. Their concern is certainly justified. Generally, the president's power to pardon is virtually unlimited and not subject to judicial review.

However, in researching the issue, I was pleasantly surprised to discover an obscure Constitutional device which insulates certain convictions/indictments from the broad pardon power granted to the president. This never before tested Constitutional process requires the House of Representatives to Impeach and the Senate to convict "civil Officers of the United States" so that pardons of those Officers pertaining to criminal prosecutions flowing from "Cases of Impeachment" can be voided.

The power to Impeach granted to Congress is essential to our Republican system of checks and balances. For what good are checks and balances if they are not employed to maintain the laws of the nation? If Fitzgerald's investigation properly alleges criminal activity by Government Officers involved with Treasongate offenses, Congress must begin Impeachment proceedings to remove those Officers.

The coming Supreme Court battle has never, in the history of American jurisprudence, been tested before. The question presented:

Whether "civil Officers of the United States", including the President and Vice President, can be pardoned for criminal convictions (or indictments prior to conviction) which flow from "Cases of Impeachment" where the Senate has voted to convict?

This issue has never been tested in our entire national history. Actually, I couldn't find a single legal discussion directly on point. No civil Officer of the United States has ever been Impeached in the House of Representatives, convicted in the Senate, then removed from office and successfully prosecuted in a criminal court only to be granted a presidential pardon.

According to the Constitution, "civil Officers of the United States" may be Impeached. So, for purposes of this analysis, we shall assume that various United States Officers, from the President and Vice President to Cabinet members and others in the State and Justice Departments, have committed impeachable offenses. We will also assume that the House has impeached these Officers after Patrick Fitzgerald's investigative report is released and that the Senate has voted to convict and thereafter removed them from office and that Grand Jury indictments have been returned following the Senate's conviction. And finally, we will also assume that the "sitting" president has issued sweeping pardons for every Officer indicted in criminal court.

This analysis will be limited to situations where convictions/indictments occur after House Impeachment and Senate conviction. Assuming indictments are returned by Fitzgerald's grand jury(s) prior to Impeachment, the president, despite the intense political fall out which is guaranteed to occur, may pardon those Officers involved, even himself. But Congress would still have a duty to Impeach those Officers. Assuming such Impeachments are followed by Senate convictions, all of the removed Officers will thereafter be subject to indictment, criminal prosecution and punishment.

Thereafter, according to a fair reading of the Constitution, criminal court indictments, convictions and sentences may not be pardoned when they flow from "Cases of Impeachment" where the Senate had voted to convict.

In order to avoid a double jeopardy defense, the Impeachment process should be completed prior to criminal trial prosecution and conviction. However, indictments alone do not trigger double jeopardy defenses.

It's well established that presidential pardons cannot overturn the "Judgment in Cases of Impeachment". Such "judgment" is directly limited, by the Constitution, to removal from office and disqualification from ever serving as an Officer of the United States.

The issue which has never been litigated before is: Whether civil Officers of the United States, removed from office by conviction in "Cases of Impeachment", who are later tried and punished in criminal courts, can thereafter be pardoned by the President? This report concludes that the Constitution bars any such pardon.

Until now, the White House could take some measure of confidence that, if all else fails, they will fall back on the erroneous public assumption that the broad pardon power granted to the president by the Constitution would shield them from criminal punishment for Treasongate offenses. But a well educated Congress and citizenry will make their illegal plight exponentially more difficult. And that is the purpose of this blog.

The presidential pardon power, when aimed at anything but "Cases of Impeachment", is virtually plenary. But the serious problem the Bush White House now faces is that most of the Treasongate perpetrators are "civil Officers of the Government" and are therefore subject to Impeachment.

Should those Officers be convicted in the Senate, following Impeachment in the House, they will nevertheless also be subject to criminal prosecution and punishment in the form of prison sentences or the death penalty. Those convictions, indictments and sentences which flow from "Cases of Impeachment" may not, according to the Constitution, be pardoned.

CitizenSpook has prepared the following analysis to educate the American people for the coming Constitutional crisis regarding the broad sweeping grant of pardons soon to be issued by the Bush White House.

WHAT THE CONSTITUTION SAYS ABOUT PARDONS

Article 2, Section 3, Clause 1:

"The President...shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment."

That's the only mention of pardons in the Constitution.

WHAT THE CONSTITUTION SAYS ABOUT IMPEACHMENT

Impeachment is mentioned only six times in the Constitution:

Article 1, Section 2, Clause 5:

"The House of Representatives...shall have the sole Power of Impeachment."

Article 1, Section 3, Clause 6:

"The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments..."

Article 1, Section 3, Clause 7:


"Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law."

Article 2, Section 2, Clause 1:

"The President...shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment."

Article 2, Section 4:

"The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."

Article 3, Section 2, Clause 3:

"The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury..."

THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER

It's a long established principle, upheld by the Supreme Court, and supported by commentary from the Constitutional Convention, that the presidential power to grant clemency is plenary except in "Cases of Impeachment."

In
Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974), the Supreme Court affirmed this broad authority. Chief Justice Burger stated that the power to pardon flows from the Constitution and "it cannot be modified, abridged, or diminished by the Congress." Id. at 266. But the Supreme Court in Schick v. Reed also announced, in three separate quotes, the only instance, besides "Cases of Impeachment", where a presidential pardon would be unconstitutional:

"Additionally, considerations of public policy and humanitarian impulses support an interpretation of that power so as to permit the attachment of any condition which does not otherwise offend the Constitution."

"...the conclusion is inescapable that the pardoning power was intended to include the power to commute sentences on conditions which do not in themselves offend the Constitution..."

"We therefore hold that the pardoning power is an enumerated power of the Constitution and that its limitations, if any, must be found in the Constitution itself."

If a presidential pardon offends the Constitution, the pardon itself is unconstitutional. Having stated that, let me make it clear that the basis for my conclusion in this report does not depend exclusively on the Supreme Court's holding in Schick v. Reed. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's opinion in that case certainly reinforces the conclusion of this report since the limitation of the presidential pardon power that I have discovered is found directly within the Constitution.

A CONSTITUTIONAL MYSTERY

The Constitution is a beautiful, albeit mysterious, creature. Sometimes it appears that different sections contradict each other, but such alleged contradictions, when followed to their logical conclusion, usually reveal the true intention and symbiotic relationship of Constitutional clauses.

An "apparent" Constitutional contradiction has helped me discover the conclusions of this report. The Constitution states, "The President...shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment."

In Schick v. Reed, Justice Burger recognized that there wasn't much discussion about presidential pardons at the Constitutional convention. Burger relied on the following comments from the convention:

"Mr. Sherman moved to amend the `power to grant reprieves and pardons' so as to read `to grant reprieves until the next session of the Senate, and pardons with consent of the Senate.' "
2M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 419 (1911). [419 U.S. 256, 263]

Justice Berger then stated:

"The proposed amendment was rejected by a vote of 8-1. Ibid. This action confirms that, as in England in 1787, the pardoning power was intended to be generally free from legislative control."

The issue was also
discussed by Daniel T. Kobil, Professor of Law at Capital University Law School in Columbus, Ohio, before the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution (February 28, 2001) :

"While a number of the delegates, including James Madison, agreed that the power to pardon treason should not be vested in the President alone, the framers ultimately were unwilling to allow the Senate to share the power to pardon."

It is not disputed that the power to pardon is granted by the Constitution to the president, and only to the president. Yet, Article 1, Section 3, Clause 7, at first glance, appears to give Congress their own power to pardon:

"Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law."

Reading the above, it seems to grant Congress the power to pardon civil Officers of the United States from criminal prosecution if a "Party" is Impeached in the House, but not convicted in the Senate; "...but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law." (Emphasis added.)

Article 1, Section 3, Clause 7 does not say, "but the Party Impeached shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment." It says, "but the Party convicted shall nevertheless..."

Does this grant Congress its own pardon power, to be exercised by Impeaching those it intended to protect from criminal prosecution, and thereafter choosing not to convict in the Senate?

The issue causes an apparent Constitutional contradiction since Article 2, Section 2, Clause 1 contains the only specific mention of pardons in the Constitution, and the power is granted therein solely to the president. As stated above, both the framers at the Constitutional Convention and the Supreme Court have determined that the power to pardon is only granted to the president. Hence, a Constitutional mystery is before us.

Since it's clear that the framers firmly rejected the notion that Congress should share the power to pardon with the president, we must determine the true meaning of
Article 1, Section 3, clause 7.

THE MYSTERY REVEALED: The Constitution Voids Pardons Aimed At Criminal Prosecutions Flowing From "Cases Of Impeachment" where the Senate has voted to convict.

By now, I'm sure you're wondering why I have consistently emphasized the term, "Cases of Impeachment". I have done this because the meaning those words are given by the Supreme Court in the very near future will determine, for all the world to see, whether our Constitutional Republic is truly protected by checks and balances or if we are a nation ruled by a federal mafia of made thugs.

The heart of this analysis is surprisingly simple.

Article 1, Section 3, Clause 7:

"Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States..."

Let's break down "Judgment in Cases of Impeachment..." Three things are mentioned:

1. JUDGMENT
2. CASES
3. IMPEACHMENT

"Impeachment" is the Constitutional process for determining whether the behavior of civil Officers of the United States warrants such Officers being removed from office. The power to exercise this process is granted exclusively to Congress.

"Cases" are made up of the underlying facts and laws reviewed by Congress during the Impeachment process.

"Judgment" is strictly defined by the Constitution and "shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States..."

Article 2, Section 2, Clause 1:

"The President...shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment." (Emphasis added.)

Please note that this clause does not say:

"The President...shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Judgments of Impeachment."

Article 1, Section 3, Clause 7 specifically rules that "Judgment in Cases of Impeachment" is limited to "removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States..."

It is undisputed that the president cannot use the pardon power to overturn the "judgment in Cases of Impeachment". If one of the president's men is removed from office, it is clearly established that such "judgment" cannot be reversed so as to allow the removed Officer to regain his position in the Government, nor can that Party ever again "hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States."

The Constitutional limitation of the presidential pardon power enumerated in Article 2, Section 2, Clause 1 is not limited to the specific "Judgment in Cases of Impeachment" listed in Article 1, Section 3, Clause 7. Since the framers very carefully defined the limitations of "Judgment in Cases of Impeachment", their wording in Article 2, Section 2 Clause 1, "The President...shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment", enumerates a limitation on the presidential pardon power which extends to criminal indictments, convictions and punishments flowing from the underlying facts and laws reviewed by Congress in "Cases of Impeachment"...
but only when the Senate votes to convict.

I submit to you that this conclusion is completely supported by a sensible examination of the particular wording of the Constitution, the framer's intent, and the opinion of the Supreme Court in Schick v. Reed.

This conclusion also serves as a beacon of illumination for the mystery contained in the second part of Article 1, Section 3, Clause 7:

"...but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law." (Emphasis added.)

The key words here are "convicted" and "shall". The framers were drawing a clear distinction between those Officers who would be Impeached and those Officers who would be Impeached and convicted.

A fair reading of this Clause implies that those Officers who were Impeached but not convicted "may be liable and subject to indictment...", and therefore reasonably pardoned whereas those Officers who are Impeached and convicted "shall nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment..."

The Clauses work together, and must be read together. The mystery is resolved by the very words in the Constitution. The framers chose their words carefully. It appears that they were deeply concerned that Officers of the United States, who were so blatantly in violation of their duty and loyalty to the laws of this nation as to be Impeached in the House and convicted by a 2/3 majority in the Senate, should not be allowed to be pardoned for crimial prosecutions flowing from such "Cases of Impeachment."

Instead of granting the Congress their own pardon power, which was clearly not the intention of the framers, the meaning of this clause can only be understood in relation to the following:

"The President...shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment." (Emphasis added.)

"Cases of Impeachment" are fundamentally different animals than "Judgment in Cases of Impeachment". While the Constitution specifically defines exactly what the "Judgment in Cases of Impeachment" must always be, it is silent as to what "Cases of Impeachment" are.

This makes sense when you consider that the circumstances, facts and laws that will make up every "Case of Impeachment" will be different from every other "Case of Impeachment" while the opposite is true of "Judgment in Cases of Impeachment", which, according to Article 1, Section 3, Clause 7, must always the same.

The legal meaning of the Constitution's distinction between the words "Judgment" and "Cases" has never been litigated in the history of American jurisprudence. My legal research has not revealed even one theoretical discussion of the distinction prior to this report.

"...but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law."

As previously stated, this Clause does not grant Congress its own pardon power. Rather, its mysterious language reveals a unique specific purpose when read in conjunction with Article 2, Section 2, Clause 1. The purpose is
to clarify that the broad pardon power granted to the president in Article 2, Section 2, Clause 1 is only limited as to criminal prosecutions (indictments, convictions and punishment) which flow from "Cases of Impeachment" when the Impeached Party has been convicted in the Senate.

The specific limitation of the pardon power that this report has discovered only comes into effect when the House has Impeached and the Senate has convicted. The president definitely has the power to pardon anyone who is Impeached in the House but not convicted in the Senate. Should the Senate follow through on conviction, things could get interesting.

Please make your elected representatives aware of their responsibility to Impeach criminals serving as civil Officers of the United States.

EPILOGUE

Please examine the image at the top of this page carefully. This is a scan of page 8, Section Ten, of The Sunday Star Ledger (a New Jersey newspaper) for July 31, 2005.

Let me draw your attention to the following curiosities:

The bottom half of the page is a history of various secret societies including The Freemasons, Skull and Bones and Opus Dei. But the first paragraph of the article states:

"Whether the confirmation hearings for Supreme Court nominee John Roberts will explode into bitter partisanship or fizzle like wet fire-cracker is anyone's guess. The payoff for Roberts if he survives the grueling process, of course, is membership in one of the nation's most rarefied institutions.

When it comes to tradition and secret rituals, however, the Supreme Court has nothing on these groups."

It then describes the history of the various secret societies.

Why is the unnamed author of this article comparing the United States Supreme Court to secret societies? The Supreme Court operates in full public view. Its members and powers are determined by Constitutional authority. Its decisions are published for all the world to see. If the only purpose of this article was to portray the Supreme Court as a "secret society", the article's purpose is insane.

But when we examine the top part of page 8, the cynical message conveyed becomes clear. Have a look at the top headline:

"A clean slate for ex-cons."

Now look at the type on the document pictured on the top right side of the page:

"Clear Your Record!
(MAKE A FRESH START)
$350
EXPUNGEMENT"

Now look at the signature on the bold face boxed quote in the middle of the top half of the page:

"MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, former pardon attorney for the United States"

Taking all of the inferences listed on this page into consideration, it appears that the fix is in.

A Senator at the confirmation hearings needs to ask Mr. John "I don't recall being an officer of the Federalist Society"
Roberts, if he recognizes a Constitutional difference between "Cases of Impeachment" and "Judgment in Cases of Impeachment". The future of our nation may depend on his answer.

By Citizen Spook
citizenspook@hotmail.com

PLEASE REPOST and LINK far and wide....